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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

In this action, Plaintiff seeks payment from Defendant,
a partial owner of an oil well location, for the value of
labor and materials furnished at the oil well location pursuant
to a contract between Plaintiff and the corporate operator
of the well,

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The case was decided by the District Court on stipulated
facts.

From a Judgment for the Plaintiff, Defendant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant seeks reversal of the Judgment and entry of
judgment in his favor as a matter of law.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

The existence of an express contract with a third

party precludes the finding of an implied contract between
Plaintiff and Defendant.
2.

Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his legal remedies

precludes his recovery from Defendant on the equitable theory
of quantum meruit.

3.

The evidence is insufficient to support a finding

of liability under quantum meruit because Plaintiff has failed
to show that Defendant was unjustly enriched.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case was submitted to the District Court on facts
which were stipulated to by Plaintiff and Defendant.

In

lieu of a record on appeal, the parties have again stipulated
to the facts and have submitted an Agreed Statement of the
Record on Appeal, which has been approved by the District
Court.
Plaintiff Stan Knight conducts an insulation business
under the name and style of Stanco Insulation Services. (R. 1.)
Defendant George P. Postf doing business as Post Petroleum
Company, owned a 33.75% working interest in an oil well location
in Uintah County, Utah; the balance of the working interest
was owned by others.

(R. 1, 2)

Post Petroleum Companyf

Inc. (not a party to this action) was the corporate operator
of said oil well.
Mr. Knight contracted with Post Petroleum Company, Inc.,
the corporate operator, to furnish labor and materials for

References to stipulated facts are to the pertinent paragraph of the Agreed Statement of the Record on Appeal, designated
by an "R" (i.e., R. 1, R. 5, etc.); references to exhibits
are to the exhibits attached to the Agreed Statement of the
Record on Appeal, designated "Ex." (i.e. Ex. "A", Ex. M D n ,
etc.) and also to the Addendum designated "Add." (i.e. Add. "1,"
Add. "3," etc.)

the insulation of an oil tank battery and erection of two
buildings at the well location. (R. 4)

Between March 18,

1982 and April 26, 1982, Mr. Knight performed and completed
the work he contracted to perform.

(R. 5, Ex. "C," Add. "2")

He then submitted his invoice (Ex. "B," Add. "1") to the
corporation in the amount of $18,437.13, which the parties
agree is the reasonable value of the materials and services
furnished. (R. 5) Due to his relationship with the corporation,
Mr. Post was aware that Mr. Knight was billing the corporation
(R. 6 ) , with which it had contracted

(R. 4 ) , and not Mr. Post

or his proprietorship personally (R. 6 ) , with whom Mr. Knight
had not contracted.
Mr. Knight's invoices were not paid and on July 14,
1982, he recorded a Notice of Lien (R. 7, Ex. "C," Add. "2")
in which he expressed his intent to hold and claim a lien
on the interest of the corporate operator in the oil well
location. (R. 7) Several months later, the corporation filed
a petition in bankruptcy and, on January 10, 1983, Mr. Knight

filed a c r e d i t o r ' s claim against the corporation in the bankruptcy
2
proceeding, seeking payment of the entire amount due.

(R. 8,

Ex. "D," Add. "3") It was at this time, nearly nine months
after the work was completed, that Mr. Knight first learned
of Mr. Post's ownership interest in the well and elected
to seek payment from him.

(R. 9, 10, 12) Until that time,

On February 6, 1984, Mr. Knight amended his bankruptcy
claim to seek only those sums which he does not recover from
Mr. Post in these proceedings. (R. 13, Ex. "F," Add. "4")

Mr. Knight did not even know of Mr. Post's existence (R.
10) and he had consistently sought payment only from the
corporation with which he had contracted.

(R. 3, 4, 5, 6,

7, 8; Ex. "B," "C," "D;" Add. "1," "2," "3")

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The District Court erred in its Ruling in favor of Plaintiff
because Plaintiff is barred as a matter of law from recovery
on quantum meruit.

Plaintiff had no express agreement with

Defendant and, therefore, he must rely on an implied contract
based on unjust enrichment.

Plaintiff is precluded however,

from recovering on the basis of an implied contract because
he had an express contract with a third party and because
he has failed to exhaust his legal remedies.
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff has not lost his right
to sue on an implied contract, the evidence is insufficient
to sustain such an action.

The stipulated facts show only

that (1) Defendant's property was benefited by Plaintiff's
work and (2) that Plaintiff has not been paid therefore.
There is a third element of unjust enrichment, however, which
is that it would be unjust for Defendant to retain the benefit.
Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof on this
point as there is no evidence even on stipulated facts, that
Defendant has been unjustly enriched.

ARGUMENT
I.
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW FROM RECOVERING
ON QUANTUM MERUIT.
A.

There is No Express Agreement with Post.

The stipulated facts clearly show that Mr. Knight never
entered into an express agreement with Mr. Post for provision
of the materials and labor which are the subject of this
litigation.

Mr. Knight admits that his contract was with

Post Petroleum Company, Inc., the corporate operator of the
well location.

(R. 4)

And, of course, he could not have

contracted with Mr. Post personally since he did not even
learn of Mr. Post's existence or his partial ownership interest
in the well until long after the work was completed.

(R. 10)

Plaintiff's right to recover from Defendant "must be based
upon an agreement, either express or implied."

Commerical

Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. vs. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774
(Utah, 1977).

There being no express agreement with this

Defendant, Plaintiff must recover, if at all, on the basis
of an implied contract.

B.

The Existence of an Express Contract Precludes the Finding
of an Implied Contract.

As noted above, Mr. Knight admits that he had an express
contract with the corporate operator, Post Petroleum Company,

Inc. (R. 4)

That very fact precludes him from from asserting

that Mr. Post is liable to him under an implied contract.
"There cannot be an express and an implied contract for the
same thing existing at the same time."

66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution

and Implied Contracts, §6, p. 948, approved in Commercial
Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. vs. Adams, supra, at 564 P.2d
774.

See also Verdi vs. Helper State Bank, 57 Utah 502,

196 Pac. 225, 15 A.L.R. 641 (1921).
The relationship of the parties in Commercial Fixtures,
supra, was similar to the relationship of the parties here.
There, the defendant's lessee, Great Outdoors, Inc., entered
into a purchase contract for materials which were incorporated
into the defendant lessor's building.

When the lessee defaulted

in payment of the purchase price, plaintiff brought suit
directly against the lessor on an implied contract theory
of unjust enrichment.

This Court denied recovery to the

plaintiff, saying:
It is also noted that there was
an express contract between plaintiff
and the lessee for the furnishing of
materials, and when an express agreement
exists one may not be implied.
564 P.2d 774.

The same result should obtain here.

Mr. Knight

contracted with Post Petroleum Company, Inc. which, just
as the tenant in Commerical Fixtures, was not the owner of
the property.

The existence of that express contract precludes

a direct action against Mr. Post in this action.

C.

The Equitable Remedy of Quantum Meruit is Not Available
to Plaintiff Because He Failed to Exhaust His Legal
Remedies.

Under the facts of this case, it is apparent that Mr. Knight
had available to him several legal remedies.

He has chosen

to forego those remedies, however, preferring instead to
initiate this direct action against Mr. Post.

Unfortunately

for Plaintiff, the law does not permit such an election.
Once again the facts in Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings,
Inc. vs. Adams, supra, are similar to the instant facts and
the law stated therein is determinative here.

In Commercial

Fixtures, this Court noted that the plaintiff had failed
to file a lien and had failed to sue the lessee.

Such failures

constituted one of the grounds on which this Court denied
plaintiff equitable relief:
The action brought by plaintiff
is one in equity and brought without
any attempt to exhaust any legal remedies
available. Also, the stipulated facts
are that plaintiff has brought no suit
against the lessee nor did he initiate
any action to enforce a mechanic's lien,
if any he had. As a consequence, such
lien right was lost by passage of time.
564 P.2d 774. The same defects and others lie here. Mr. Knight
failed to record a valid lien, failed to initiate an action
under the owner's bond statutes, and failed to pursue his
claim in bankruptcy against the corporate operator.

It is to be noted that Mr. Knight did attempt to impose
a lien on the property but failed to properly describe the
interest to which the lien was to attach.

A review of the

Notice of Lien (Ex. "C," Add. "2") shows that Mr. Knight
was uncertain as to the interest held by Post Petroleum Companyf
Inc. in the property.

The lien notice states that he intended

to hold and claim a lien "upon the property and improvements
thereon owned and reputed to be owned by Post Petroleum Companyf
Inc. as lessee or operator of the mineral rights. . . . "
(Ex. "C," Add. "2" lines 3-6; emphasis supplied)

Further,

Mr. Knight stated in the second single spaced paragraph of
the Notice that, "The undersigned furnished said materials
to was [sic] employed by Post Petroleum Company, Inc., who
was the operator, . . . ."

(emphasis supplied) Thus it appears

that Mr. Knight knew that Post Petroleum Company, Inc. was
the operator of the well but apparently was uncertain as
to whether or not it was a lessee thereof.

In view of his

uncertainty, Mr. Knight had a duty to inquire or to investigate
the records of the Uintah County Recorder to determine the
legal title owner.

Having failed to do so he cannot be heard

to complain that he liened the interest of the operator which,
of course, was a fruitless act since the operator had no
interest.
Mr. Knight also had an opportunity to recover his debt
under what is commonly known as the owner's bond statute,
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended) §§14-2-1, et seq.
(Add. "6")

Under that law, providers of labor and materials

have a direct right of action against the sureties if a bond
has been posted

(§14-2-1) or f if no bond has been posted,

a direct right of action against the owners. (§14-2-2)

Such

actions may be brought at any time within one year from the
date last materials were furnished or labor performed.
2-2)

(§14-

Mr. Knight completed his contract on April 26, 1982

(Ex. "C," Add. " 2 " ) f thus he had a right to sue until April 26,
1983.

Yet he failed to avail himself of that opportunity,

even after he learned of Mr. Post's partial ownership when
the bankruptcy proceeding was filed in January, 1983.
Finally, Mr. Knight has failed to assert and prosecute
his claims in the bankruptcy proceeding, electing instead
to sue Mr. Post on implied contract.

Mr. Knight did initially

file a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding for the entire
amount due (R. 8, Ex. "D," Add. "3"), but has since amended
that claim to seek only the difference between the amount
due and what he recovers here.

(R. 13, Ex. "F," Add.

,f

4")

Thus he has once again failed to pursue a legal remedy available
to him.
Courts of other jurisdictions have followed the same
rule of law as that followed by this Court in Commerical
Fixtures, supra.

In Utschig vs. McClone, 114 N.W.2d 854

(Wis. 1962), the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that the subcontractor f s lien statutes of Wisconsin offer security and protection to subcontractors and refused to allow direct action
against the property owner, saying that the subcontractor's
"failure to avail himself of the remedy so provided does

not produce for him a right to recover payment directly from
an owner who did not employ him with whom he had no contract."
114 N.W.2d 856.

And in Dale's Service Company/ Inc. vs.

Jonesy 534 P.2d 1102 (Idaho, 1975), a case which is on "all
fours" with the instant action, the Supreme Court of Idaho
refused to allow a subcontractor's direct claim in quantum
meruit against a land owner where it had not availed itself
of its remedies under the mechanic's lien laws.
1107.

534 P.2d

See generally 62 A.L.R.3d 288, Subcontractor's Recovery

Against Owner, §4, pp. 297-303, and cases cited therein,
wherein the annotator observed at page 297 that denial of
recovery by a subcontractor is:
[G]enerally grounded . . . upon such
factors as the insufficiency of the evidence
to establish any unjust enrichment of
the land owner at the subcontractor's
loss or expense and the failure of the
subcontractor to have availed himself
of his other remedies.
II.
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROVING
EACH ELEMENT NECESSARY TO A RECOVERY ON QUANTUM MERUIT.

Even on stipulated facts, Plaintiff's evidence does
not support a judgment against this Defendant on a theory
of quantum meruit.

Plaintiff apparently assumes that he

is entitled to recover if he shows simply that he performed
work which benefited Mr. Post's property and that he was
not paid for that work.

That is not enough.

As was said

by this Court in Commerical Fixtures and Furnishingsf Inc.
vs. Adams, supra:
The mere fact that a person benefits
from a contract between two others does
not make such third person liable in
quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or
restitution. See 66 Am.Jur.2d 960.
There must be some misleading act, request
for services, or the like, to support
such an action. Mere failure of performance
by one of the contracting parties does
not give rise to a right of restitution.
564 P.2d 774.

Mr. Knight has shown that the property of

a third party, Mr. Post, was benefited by a contract between
he and the corporate operator.

As stated by the Commerical

Fixtures Court, that is not enough.

Mr. Knight has also

shown that the corporate operator failed to perform its side
of the contract by not paying Plaintiff.

Again, as stated

by the Commerical Fixtures Court, that is still not enough.
And obviously Mr. Post did not request Mr. Knight's services
since his existence was not even known until long after the
work was completed.

(R. 10)

Mr. Knight's only claim is that the name of Mr. Post's
proprietorship, Post Petroleum Company, is similar to the
corporate operator's name, Post Petroleum Company, Inc.
Under the facts of this case, we fail to see how that circumstance could have misled Mr. Knight and resulted in his loss
of direct remedies otherwise available to him.

He admits

that he knew he was contracting with the corporation.

(R. 4)

His Notice of Lien indicates that he was uncertain as to
whether the corporation had a leasehold interest in the property

or was merely the operator thereof.

(Ex. "C," Add. "2")

Significantly, he does not claim that he was misled by some
document or misrepresentation.

Obviously, he erroneously

assumed that the operator was the owner.

But under such

an assumption, the situation would have been no different
had Mr. Post's proprietorship been named the XYZ Oil Company.
The crux of every action in quantum meruit is that the
defendant has been unjustly enriched.

Pendleton vs. Sard,

297 A. 2d 887, 62 A.L.R.3d 277 (Me. 1972).

The basis of liabi-

lity is the benefit conferred upon the defendant and not
the detriment incurred by plaintiff.

First Investment Company

vs. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah, 1980).

Thus it is

Plaintiff's burden to show unjust enrichment. However, Mr.
Knight has wholly failed to adduce any evidence that Mr.
Post has been unjustly enriched.

He simply assumes that

since the property was benefited, he is entitled to recover.
But mere enrichment is not sufficient—it must be unjust
enrichment.

"Clearly every benefit conferred is not recompen-

sable and unjustly received."

Kershaw vs. Tracy Collins

Bank & Trust Company, 561 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah 1977).
Unjust enrichment cannot be presumed.
have been enriched, but not unjustly.

Mr. Post could

For instance, Mr.

Post's payment of Post Petroleum Company, Inc. pursuant to
his contract with it would make his acceptance of the benefits
just, as opposed to unjust, since he then did not accept

the benefit without payment therefore.

See Crockett vs.

Sampsony 439 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App., 1969); Rogers vs.
Whitson, 228 Cal.Ap.2d 662, 39 Cal. Rptr. 849 (Cal. 1964).

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff is not entitled
to recover in quantum meruit on the facts of this case.
Plaintiff's recovery is barred as a matter of law since he
has no express contract with Defendant, he had an express
contract with the corporate operator which precludes the
finding of an implied contract, and he has failed to pursue
his legal remedies.

Further, the evidence fails to show

that Defendant was unjustly enriched.

The lower court's

ruling should be reversed and judgment entered in Defendant's
favor, no cause of action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this £v

/>
day of June, 1985.

PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER

P\ Alan Fletctier
Attorneys for Appellant
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Attachment
Number
Stanco Insulation Services Statement,
dated 6/17/82 (Ex. "B")

1

Notice of Lien (Ex. H C n )

2

Proof of Claim in Bankruptcy (Ex. "D")

3

Amended Proof of Claim [in Bankruptcy]
(Ex. "F")

4

Ruling [of the D i s t r i c t Court]

5

Section 1 4 - 2 - 1 , e t seq. , Utah Code
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NOTICE OF LIEN
The undersigned WILLIAM STANFORD KNIGHT, as owner of STANCO
INSULATION

SERVICE

3 2
Hereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a lien upon
the property and improvements

thereon owned and reputed

owned by POST PETROLEUM CO., INC., as

to be

lessee or operator of the

mineral rights and located in Uintah County, Utah, more particularly
described as follows:
TOWNSHIP "1 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, U.S.B.&M.
Section 9: The Roosevelt Unit -1-19

/- ..V • '
The amount demanded hereby is §18,43/. 13 owing to the 'undersignpd for
furnishing materials used in performing labor upon the construction
improvement upon the above described property, to wi t,: ^in'sula t ing
afl oil well battery and erection of 2 buildings.
'/ # *'C .^

•Q O

The undersigned furnished said materials to was employed by
POST PETROLEUM CO., INC., who was the operator, such being done
by the undersigned under a contract made between POST PETROLEUM CO.
inc. and the undersigned by the terms and conditions of which
the undersigned did agree to Pay cash when the contract was performed,
oar net within 30 days after completion in consideration of payment
to the undersigned therefore as follows:
Insulated battery built 2 buildings and furnished materials for
the same . ,
and under wich contract the first material was furnished labor was
performed on the 18th day of March, 1982 and the last was so
furnished or performed on the 26th day of April; 1982, and for all
of which materials labor the undersigned became entitled to
$18,437.13, which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which paypayments have been made and credits and offsets allowed
to

$ 0

amounting

leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of

$18,437.13

after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which demand
the undersigned holds and claims a lien by virtue of the provisions
of Chapter 1, Title 38, Utah Code annotated 1953.
STANCO INSULATION SERVICE^

EXHIBIT

(L

^ \

^

^
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STATE OF UTAH
County of Duchesne
WILLIAM STANFORD KNIGHT being first duly suorn, says that he is Fooscvelt
Branch Manager of the «claiiraut in the foxe£oin& Notice of L\cn; that he
has read said notice and knows the contents thereof, and that the Ecjne is
true of his own knowledge

~r—/
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Bankruptcy
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1. (a) Ti.il he is the claimant herein.
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~
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t
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authorised to ;rj al<e this proof of claim on Its behalf.
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IK THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JL;\ K L :

POST PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC.,

No. BK-82-01S89-B
(Chapter 11)

Debtor.
AMENDED PROOF OF CLAIM
COMES NOW William Stanford Knight, dba Stanco Insulation
Services and hereby and herewith amends his Proof of Claim heretofore filed for the sum of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTYSEVEN AND 13/100 DOLLARS ($18,437.13) and hereby serves notice
• pon the Debtor in possession; Creditor's Coirimittee and/or Trustee,
f appointed, that further facts have developed indicating that
ost Petroleum Company, Inc., may not have an interest in the
il well and properties in Uintah County, State of Utah, and
ccordingly litigation has been commenced against George P. Post,
Da Post Petroleum Company, a proprietorship, for collection of
lis matter.
This Proof of Claim is hereby amended and will be credited
th any amounts recovered in the civil action pending in Uintah
unty, State of Utah, wherein George P. Post, dba Post Petroleum
mpany, is Defendant, Civil No. 12480.
The effect of this amendment is to make the Proof of Claim
sed upon a debt which may have a contingent liability determinatior

DOCKS'

the Debtor in possession and/or Trustee is hereby given notice
of this status and the claim is hereby amended in accordance
herewith.
DATED this

, C'

day of February, 1984.

William Stanford Knight, 'dba J
Stanco Insulation Services /
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF UINTAH

)

ss
William Stanford Knight, dba Stanco Insulation Services,
being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states:

That

he has read the above and foregoing Amended Proof of Claim, with
the contents therein, that the same is true and correct, except
as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as
to such matters he believes the same to be true.
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.Hi am Stanford Knight, dba S
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Notary P u b l i c
Residing i n V e r n a l , Utah
My Commission E x p i r e s :
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Knight, dba Stanco Insulation
Services
185 North Vernal Avenue, Suite 1
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: (801) 789-1201

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STAN KNIGHT dba STANCO INSULATION
SERVICES,
PLAINTIFF,

RULING

vs.
GEORGE P. POST dba POST
PETROLEUM COMPANY,
DEFENDANT.

CIVIL NO. 12,480

The issue in this case is whether a contract can be implied
between Plaintiff and Defendant upon the Theory of Quantum
Meruit.

The Elements of Quantum Meruit are generally that one

party bestows a benefit upon another and retention of that benefit without compensation would be unjust.

The effect of finding

these elements is the implication of a contract between the
parties requiring payment for the benefit.

The problem in this

case arises when the work is performed at the request of one
party but a third party is charged with receiving the benefit.
In such a case, normally the third party cannot be held to be
liable.

However, two factors must be considered.

First, was the

third party to be the ultimate beneficiary of the benefit?

In

this case, the Defendant, being the owner of the well, was to be
the ultimate beneficiary of the benefit and for that purpose
obtained the services of the corporation to do the work.

EXHIBIT

&

The

corporation subsequently entered into an agreement with
Plaintiff, the benefit of such flowing to the Defendant.

While

Plaintiff may have been acting under a mistaken impression of
fact, the Defendant and the corporation were not.

The Defendant

was the owner desiring the benefit, the well drilled and put into
production, and the corporation was hired to do so.
Second, the relationship of the parties must be examined.
Certainly, some relationship between Defendant and the corporation existed at the time of Plaintiff's services.

The fact that

Plaintiff may have been confused and billed the wrong party
likely was known or should have been known to Defendant and the
corporation.

Such confusion cannot now be raised to shield the

Defendant from responsibility when such confusion may have been
contributed to by Defendant's action or inaction.
The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover from
Defendant for the value of his services and materials received by
defendant.
The Court has not been shown the relationship of Defendant
to the other owners of the well.
Defendant is only a partial owner.

It has been stipulated that
Consequently, judgment is

granted against Defendant in the sum of 33.75% of the amount
claimed by Plaintiff, such judgment being $6,222.53, together

with Court costs.
DATED thiis

J j

day of February, 1985.
BY THE COURT:

<M^^Lh^
cc:

John R. Anderson
F. Alan Fletcher

Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended),
Title 14, Chapter 2: Private Contracts
14-2-1. Bond to protect mechanics and materialmen. The owner of any interest in land entering into a contract, involving $2,000 or more, for the construction,
addition to, or alteration or repair of, any building, structure or improvement upon
land shall, before any such work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond
in a sum equal to the contract price, writh good and sufficient sureties, conditioned
for the faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment for material furnished and labor performed under the contract. Such bond shall run to the owner
and to all other persons as their interest may appear; and any person who has
furnished materials or performed labor for or upon any such building, structure
or improvement, payment for which has not been made, shall have a direct right
of action against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable value of the materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in any case the prices
agreed upon; which right of action shall accrue forty days after the completion,
or abandonment, or default in the performance, of the work provided for in the
contract.
The bond herein provided for shall be exhibited to any person interested, upon
request.

14-2-2. Failure to require bond—Direct liability—Limitation of actions,
—Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to
obtain such good and sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as heroin
required, shall be personalty liable to all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable value of
such materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding, however, in
any case the prices agreed upon. Actions to recover on such liability KIJJIII
be commenced within one year from the last date the last materials weve
furnished or the labor performed.

14-2-3. Action on bond to protect mechanics and materialmen—Attorney's fee.—In any action brought upon the bond provided for under this
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorney's fee to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the
action.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this £<r

day of June, 1985,

I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to:
John R. Anderson
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
185 North Vernal Avenue
Vernal, Utah 84078-2196

F.^Alan Fletcher

